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The legality and political legitimacy of the Francoist New State in
Spain during the Civil War and the immediate post-war period
entailed the formulation of a doctrine and criminal legislation that
enabled the regime to repress its political opponents, as well as to
10gain control over Spanish society as a whole. This article analyzes
how this process of the social construction of the offender was
based on the categorization of the other as a dangerous and
morally and socially harmful enemy, mainly through the creation
of a new offender-based criminal law.
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15The events of the coup d’etat of 17 and 18 July 1936 in Spain, which a part of the Spanish
army’s officers provoked against the Republican democratic regime, broke the rule of law
and the public order system without securing a hold on power. This led to a situation of
civil war in which the military occupation of the capital, Madrid, continued to be the
primary objective of the insurgents.
20In this article, we shall focus on the cultural aspects of the civil war, which involved
collective mobilization in a common representation that gave meaning to peoples’
experiences. Accordingly, the symbolic dimension of politics is prioritized. The origin
of the Spanish New State in the circumstances of a war made the political grouping in the
face of the so-called enemy reach its maximum degree of political polarity. This phenom-
25enon was not new, but the context of warfare exacerbated it. From the first moments of
the war, the propaganda of the Francoist side used the image of the anti-Spain. This
propaganda discourse had been used before to promote popular support for political
conservatism in the climate of electoral competition and political confrontation during
the Second Republic, especially in moments of collective turmoil such as the general
30election of February 1936.
This article explores how the abstract and general category of the enemy had an
impact as a propaganda stereotype in those wartime circumstances. Furthermore, it is
stated that the stereotype of the enemy influenced as a positive legal concept in what can
be called the new criminal law of the Francoist New State in Spain.1 Similarly, it
35establishes that the New State did not only base its legality as a legitimate regime on
a discourse and legal practice against the enemy. The idea of the enemy also provided its
political legitimacy by claiming the constitutional illegality of the Republican government
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and its lack of legitimate exercise. In order to establish the degree of accuracy of this
interpretation, we need to explore to what extent the idea of the enemy was used as legal
40category in the totalitarian new criminal law during the Francoist dictatorship in Spain,
and how the stereotype of the supposed internal enemy was used to highlight the
illegitimacy of political action by Republican governments since 1931.
This particular approach has been adopted above all in the case of Germany with the
regard to political violence and the repression of the political opposition and of certain
45social groups and racial minorities, especially Jews.2 The application of the criminal law
of the enemy has been examined mainly through the Nuremberg Laws which were
enacted by the German Reichstag on 15 September 1935.3 The influence of the new
Nazi penal doctrine in Spain occurred mainly through the dissemination of Carl Smith’s
political and legal thought.4 The importance of the enemy’s image, and particularly the
50development of the criminal law of the enemy in the Francoist New State, has not been
sufficiently highlighted in the extensive Spanish historiography on political repression,
and qualifies an old thesis about the “militarization” of public order in Spain. Regarding
this thesis, Manuel Ballbé affirmed that under the Spanish Restoration, military methods
continued to be applied for the maintenance of social order, which contributed to the
55“denaturalization” of the Army.5 In particular, following the political and social crisis of
1917 in Spain, the attribution of civil power to the armed forces intensified, and they
acquired a strong awareness of their power vis-à-vis the political class. Accordingly, we
should also emphasize the importance of the book that Carolyn P. Boyd dedicated to the
“praetorian politics” of the period 1917–1923.6 In this final period, the economic
60dislocation, the social and political upheaval, and the colonial war in the Spanish
Moroccan protectorate exerted unprecedented pressures on the anachronistic political
system of the Restoration. This led the rulers to reinforce their dependence on the Army,
as had happened with the coup d’état of General Primo de Rivera on 13 September 1923.
In this article, the approach is rather that the repressive policy and the new penal order
65in the Francoist New State was not a simple continuity of the militarization of public
order in Spain, but it implied a qualitative change. This was consistent with the broader
centrality of decision-making in legal and political theory during the interwar period in
Europe.7 Secondly, we intend to establish a model from the Spanish case of how the
exception of “criminal law of the enemy” in the interwar dictatorships became the
70political and legal norm through a broad process of criminal codification of the image
of the enemy, and its importance in the concept of the political from the late twenties in
interwar Europe. In this way, from an interdisciplinary point of view, the notion of
political culture may allow for a rethinking of certain categories and practices of criminal
law in inter-war dictatorships.8
75Extraordinary jurisdiction for enemy repression9
Extending the declaration of the State of War to the entire Spanish national territory by
the National Defence Council on 28 July 1936 expanded the special military jurisdiction
and separated it from the ordinary jurisdiction.10 This Army competence in defense of
the political regime and the social order against internal enemies had been established in
80Article 2 of the Army Constitution of 29 November 1878.11 By Decree from
25 August 1936, it was ordered that the commanders-in-chief of the operational armies
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would exercise the jurisdiction of war, which could be delegated to the commanding
generals of the divisions or brigades and to the superior commanders of the naval forces.
The generals and commanders would assume jurisdiction in the territories that remained
85under their control.12 At the same time, a Decree from 1 September established the rules
to which the judicial procedures competing with the War and Navy jurisdictions had to
be subjected.13 The preamble justifying this provision emphasized the need for summary
justice in order to achieve greater military effectiveness and civil movement. In Article 1
it was ordered that all the cases within the War and Navy jurisdictions should be dealt
90with by summary justice procedures, for which some modifications were introduced in
the Code of Military Justice and the Naval Law of Military Prosecution, mainly reinfor-
cing the procedural competences of military auditors. In the organization of the extra-
ordinary military jurisdiction, Decree No 42 from 24 October created a High Court of
Military Justice, for which Francisco Gómez Jordana Souza, Lieutenant General of the
95Army Reserve, was appointed as President.14
A key factor in penal procedure militarization was the urgent summary trial proce-
dure, which was regulated by Decree No. 55 from 1 November. The application of this
procedure was justified as necessary to ensure the speed and exemplary function of
military justice before the military occupation of Madrid. These procedural rules were
100decreed to restore legal order in the capital and tackle the supposedly unnumbered
crimes under the Republican government.15 Eight War Councils were created to resolve
the previous proceedings of sixteen military courts.16 The prolongation of the war after
the military offensive to occupy Madrid had failed, displacing the offensive to the
Northern front, leading to the expansion of urgent summary trial procedures to all
105“liberated” places, or those “to be liberated” by Decree from 26 January 1937.17 These
places remained under the jurisdiction of the occupation army. The punishment frame-
work was completed with the death penalty restoration by Law on 5 June 1938, which
amended the Article 27 of the Penal Code of 1932. This was the punishment for ordinary
crimes of robbery with homicide, parricide and murder.18
110The application of criminal law in National Spain under the declaration of a state of
emergency was legitimized mainly by the precepts of Catholic morality, which amended
rationalist positivism. This led to the conception of punishment as a means of redeeming
guilt. However, Decree No 281 from 28 May 1937 granted this right to prisoners of war
and prisoners for extraordinary crimes, based on the national syndicalist doctrine of the
115right to work, according to point fifteen of the program of the single-party.19
Thus, punishment was regarded as a means of redeeming sentences through work, as
sanctioned by the Order issued on 7 October 1938. As the preamble of this provision
stated, the material dispensation of the subsidies had to be led by a vocation to apostolate,
seeking the spiritual and political improvement of the prisoners and their families,
120tearing out “the poison of the ideas of hatred and unpatriotic attitudes, replacing them
with those of mutual love and close solidarity among the Spanish people.”20 Crime was
understood through the metaphor of moral illness, which could infect the healthy social
body.
The Jesuit José A. Pérez del Pulgar, who was then a member of the Central Board for
125the Remission of Sentences through Work, highlighted the tradition and idiosyncrasy of
remission in the Spanish penal system, which reformed the corrections’ doctrine. As an
act of submission and reparation on the part of the offender, remission work sought
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spiritual, cultural, religious, patriotic and social growth to conquer spirits lost to God and
the Country, and it established a union between the religious apostolate and the spiritual
130and social pacification of Spain, together with its material reconstruction.21
Consequently, the system of sentences remission through work was linked to probation
by the Decree of 9 June 1939.22
Along with the weight of the military jurisdiction in the judicial administration,
another characteristic of the legal order of the New Spanish State was the generalization
135of the special jurisdictions in the postwar period. To this end, a series of courts were
created, with hardly any procedural guarantees.23 The implementation of special juris-
dictions involved the extension of the actor-based criminal law in the Spanish criminal
doctrine. The special jurisdiction of political responsibilities was constituted by the Law
of Political Responsibilities of 8 February 1939, which retroactively declared the political
140responsibility of the persons who, from 1 October 1934 and up to 18 July 1936, con-
tributed to create or worsen the situation of subversion, and who had opposed the
“National Movement” with particular acts or with serious passivity from 18 July.24 The
Special Court for the Repression of Freemasonry and Communism was first constituted
by the Decree of 4 June 1940. This law complied with the provisions of the Law of
1451 March of that year, which also established retroactively that a special court could
commission actions and proceedings to the judges of the ordinary and military jurisdic-
tions for similar crimes.25
The normalization of military justice administration in the post-war period was
followed by the Law of 12 July 1940, which reinstated the Code of Military Justice with
150the same wording it had on 14 April 1931.26 In this process, the adaptation of the current
criminal legislation to the needs of public order of the New State led to the approval of
State Security Law of 29 March 1941. In its preamble, it was stated that the existing Code
from 1932 was obsolete with regard to the imperatives and realities of the time. Thus, the
Francoist government was concerned about the proclamation of a new Criminal Code
155that “gathering the essence of the current regime, knows how to apply the progress of
criminal science and the fundamental principles of our legal traditions in appropriate
formulas.”27 Meanwhile, the Law for State Security made up for those deficiencies in
criminal legislation.
Extraordinary jurisdiction, both military and special, featured as a novelty the legal
160admission of the category of the enemy in the criminal law of Franco’s New State. In
particular, the application of actor-based criminal law preventively provided the offender
with the category of deviant due to their moral qualities, convictions, personality or
previous conduct. The essence of the crime lay in a characteristic of the perpetrator as
a social entity within their political community, which explains the application of the
165punishment as a means of social defense. In the Spanish New State, the new law had to be
a law of protection and defense of the values constituting the socio-political reality, and
had to consider the human reality of the offender as a member of a political
community.28 The criminal action had two dimensions: the conduct of an individual,
but within a particular historical community.29 Criminal law should address the reality of
170the offender and the need of the State to defend itself from those who were its putative
enemies. The law had to be a law of guilt,’ which focused on the resolutions of the
person’s will, with a balance between the personal and social aspects of the offence,
connecting the offender with the political idea of their community.30
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Criminal responsibility was based on the innate dangerousness of the offender, and
175implied that the crime be defined solely by the fact that it could constitute a danger for
legal right, that is, the offender was an enemy of the juridical good, and consequently their
thoughts as well as their inner and private life were subject to punishment. The criminal
law of the enemy optimized the protection of public goods, and therefore all criminaliza-
tions of what materially were preparatory acts fell within its framework.31 Behind such
180preventive criminalization was the differentiation of the so-called enemy due to their alien
status. The enemy was considered so especially because of their foreign, external associa-
tion, such as Freemasons, Marxists and Jews. After the outbreak of the civil war, the anti-
Masonic, anti-Jewish and anti-Marxist campaigns that had taken place in the political and
electoral context of the Spanish Republic, were to be seen once again; now the war itself
185approved the specifically political distinction between friend and enemy.32
Legal reform was determined by the political activity of the New State, and it
combined the national and social concepts in a new way of understanding and applying
the essence of the basic concepts of criminal law. Crime was understood in a holistic way,
that is, under the idea that within crime there was a human and social substance that can
190be explained by its political dimension. Beyond its limits, actor-based criminal law was
conceived as will-based criminal law, whose substance was the conscience of the
offender.33 It was ostensibly about political justice, whose objective was to increase the
sphere of political action. For this purpose, court services were recruited through a set of
exceptional rules or by the denaturing of the judicial procedure. This justice was
195characterized by the submission of any individual and collective act to the scrutiny of
the court in order to strengthen the own situation of society and weaken that of their
political adversaries.34
The illegitimacy of republican powers
In the New State, the repressive system was justified solely on the basis of violence and the
200final victory achieved on 1 April. Various legal reports and successive criminal investiga-
tions were used by the Commission of Truth which demonstrated the legitimacy of the
so-called national cause, and the guilt and illegitimacy of those who had not supported it.
In advanced stages of the war, when the Republican government led by Juan Negrín had
moved to Barcelona at the end of October 1937, an audit of the so-called Army of
205Occupation reported on what were termed the constitutional infractions committed by
the Red Government. The report denounced the “suspicious legitimist ostentation” of the
Republican government:
In the same suspicious insistence with which the Red Government—yesterday, of Madrid
and Valencia, and today, of Barcelona—proclaims the legitimacy and constitutionality of its
210national representation, is the first unequivocal sign of the cynical legal farce carried out by
the people responsible for the dramatic situation in Spain.35
The report explained how this legal and judicial scam had occurred. It was argued that
the Constitution of 1931 has been drawn up by the same individuals who had been
behind the aborted revolution in Jaca in December 1930 and who, later, had perpetrated
215the revolutionary uprising of October 1934. This was regarded a contravention of the
existing constitutional order:
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In October 1934, with no power and without governmental commitments, those same men
mobilized their masses and openly exhibited their discrepancy with the Basic Law they had
voted for, igniting the revolution in Asturias, which was fighting for communism and
220libertarian anarchism, and in Catalonia where on the night of the 5th to the 6th of the afore-
mentioned month, the current President of the Autonomous Government of Catalonia
declared the so-called ‘Catalan State’ thus positioning himself outside Spain, its Constitution
and its laws.36
This was the path that had led to the triumph of subversion in February 1936. The final
225considerations of the report, which remained unpublished, included—in addition to the
transgressions against constitutional legality—other transgressions committed against
the rest of the legislation, not to mention the “immense list of crimes, the hundreds of
thousands of horrendous murders, destructions, fires, violations . . . transgressions in
short, not only of written state laws, but of all those that rule over the most primitive
230relationships between human beings” were left aside.37 The conclusion was simple and
categorical: “All divine and human laws having being dishonored, violated and left
inoperative, the red territory can rightly be called ‘The Lawless Land.”38
After resuming its activity, the plenary session of the Royal Academy of Moral and
Political Sciences, held on 1 March 1938 in San Sebastian, unanimously approved the
235report entitled El Movimiento Nacional ante el Derecho y la Justicia, whose academic
speaker was the priest Juan Zaragüeta.39 In his report, he answered four questions: what
was the legality of the power that was raised against National Spain?; what was the
legitimacy of said power?; what was the de facto and de jure situation with regard to the
sovereignty of both areas in Spain at the time?; and finally, how was such sovereignty
240regarded abroad? The legality of the Republican regime created in February 1936 as
a result of the parliamentary elections that led to the victory of the Popular Front, was
questioned. If the origins of the electoral victory of the Popular Front were questionable,
the legality of their actions was less clear with regard to the amnesty of those sentenced
for the October 1934 revolution and the dismissal of the President of the Republic, with
245Manuel Azaña elected in his place.40 After the National Uprising of 18 June 1936, the
Republican government did not fully maintain the constitutional normality with regard
to the summoning of Parliament, and did not respect the correct functioning of the
permanent Council either. Likewise, they abused the prolongation of the state of alert and
ruled by decree in legislative matters. Moreover, the Court of Constitutional Guarantees
250was ineffective in the exercise of its powers.41
But legitimacy was above legality, said Zaragüeta. If legality consisted of a system of
legal facts and legal attributions of governors and the governed in mutual balance,
legitimacy was evident in the use or abuse that they all made of their activity within
their legal jurisdictions. Legitimacy was inspired by the postulates of law and natural law,
255and the supreme requirements of the ideal right for the progressive realization of human
ends. Before constitutional legality, social reality was organized hierarchically in an
organic way and full of a national tradition that struggled to break through. Then
a reaction arose of the real over the legal, and of social life over political devices.42 The
Constitution of 1931 had not really satisfied any of the right-wing parties (due to its
260socializing tendencies and its aggressiveness against all religious matters), nor any of the
left-wing parties. These considered it as a transaction with their rivals, or as a provisional
regime of political revolution, which would be overthrown in a relatively short period of
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time by the true and definitive social revolution. It was a matter of turning constitutional
freedom into a dictatorship of the proletariat, and of imposing either a socialist or
265communist nationalization, subjecting national life to international life, or a new order
based on libertarian anarchy or Anarcho-syndicalism. In any case, said Zaragüeta, the
religious and Catholic spiritual tradition of Spain would be wiped clean.43 Both the right-
and left-wing parties aspired to reform or constitutional transformation. In any case,
while the former did not hide it, although it opted mainly to do so by the legal use of
270suffrage, the latter—at least its most extreme and numerous sector—was not satisfied
with it. Impatience induced them to violence, prompting further opposition, in the face
of which public powers did not act in defense of justice. Neither the outbreak nor the
spread of violence could be attributed to the caudillos of the National Movement. The
latter’s non-responsibility in this was the foundation for its justification in the face of
275illegitimacy of power, which did not effectively defend lives and property.44 The legiti-
macy of the New State was therefore based upon the natural law of scholastic sources, on
which counter-revolutionary thought had been formed in Spain. The legitimacy of
positive laws ultimately depended on their agreement with natural law, which meant
that the validity of the law depended on its justice. Revolutionary violence called the
280neutrality of the legislative State of the Republic into question; it was therefore not a Rule
of Law.45
The foreseeable end of the conflict—after the Battle of the Ebro in September 1938 and
the offensive on the Catalonian front—prompted the authorities of “National Spain” to
reaffirm their political legality. This happened through the actions of a Commission,
285created by the Order of 21 December that year. Its mission was to fully demonstrate the
acting powers’ illegitimacy on 18 July 1936. The revision of such powers was necessary,
because “One of the strategies that Marxist Spain has used with greatest perseverance in
its huge propaganda campaign compensating for an effective force that it does not have
and for a moral support devoid of cause, is that of constantly accusing National Spain of
290being factious, rebellious and anti-juridical.”46 Accordingly, it was stated that:
In order for this [the truth] to be exposed, accompanied by the most rigorous tests, capable
of satisfying the most demanding, National Spain is opening important proceedings, aimed
at demonstrating to the world, in an incontrovertible and documented way, our accusatory
thesis against the would-be legitimate powers, namely that the bodies and persons who held
295power on 18 July 1936, will suffer from such vices of illegitimacy in their titles and in the
exercise thereof, that, when the Army and the people rose up against them, they did not
perform any act of rebellion against the Authority or against the Law.47
The order would include “the authentic evidence of the great parliamentary fraud of the
Popular Front.”48 It would reveal the falsification of suffrage against the counter-
300revolution and for the benefit of the Marxist forces to such a degree that it subverted
the result of the electoral contest, the assault on command posts, the crimes and offences
committed or sanctioned by the Government. The murder of Calvo Sotelo served as “an
example for people, in whose criminal clutches more than four hundred thousand
brothers of ours have been brutally slaughtered in prisons, in secret police committees
305and on the roads of red Spain.”49 After the extension of the deadline to publish the result
of its proceedings, the judgement was approved by unanimous acclamation of the
Plenary of the Commission held on 15 February 1939, and was immediately published
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along with a comprehensive appendix with the demonstrative facts of each statement.
The preliminary comments highlighted the unanimity of all the Commission members
310regarding a common conviction: that the powers acting in the Republic on 18 July were
substantially and formally illegitimate. The legitimate right of Christian rebellion against
tyranny was based on the faculty of resisting oppression.50
Tyranny or harm done to the innocent was a cause of fair war. This defense of fair war
as the origin of the legitimacy of the New State coincided with the determination of the
315criminal responsibility of the vanquished in Spain. To this end, the judicial investigation
of an order on criminal acts throughout national territory during the so-called red
domination was decreed on 26 April 1940 by the Ministry of Justice. The work entrusted
to the Public Prosecutor’s Office specified:
It is important that these investigations, under the name of ‘General Cause,’ acquire their
320true importance, encompassing the whole extent and intensity of the crimes committed, but
reducing to a synthesis the set of inquiries that, due to their similarities and coincidences,
reveal a preconceived plan, the result of the same inspirations at the service of the most
perverse ideals.
The Cause will intend to include the preparatory acts of subversion and the final conduct of the
325vanquished leaders, and investigate the elements concerning the crime, its causes and effects,
procedures used in its execution, attribution of responsibilities, identification of victims and
definition of the damages caused both in the material order and in the moral order, against
people or against goods, as well as against the National Religion, Culture, Art and Heritage.
The decree granted special powers to the Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, who could
330delegate to the prosecutors of the provinces, and the authorities and the civil and military
corporations were required to collaborate in their preparation. The decree of
19 June 1943 established the appointment of a Chief Prosecutor of the General Cause.
The information, collected by provinces, was divided into eleven pieces: Main (list of acts
against the life, security and freedom of the people committed in all the towns and cities
335of each province, indicating their perpetrators or suspects and their situation); National
Uprising: background, Red Army and liberation; Jail and removal of prisoners to be
executed; Secret police committees; Red justice; Press; Action of local government
authorities; Crimes against property and reports of the Official Chambers of
Commerce and Industry; Banking; Religious persecution; and Artistic treasure and red
340culture. These legal proceedings continued until 1946, although a preview of the infor-
mation instructed by the Public Prosecutor’s Office was published in 1944.51 Justice
Minister Eduardo Aunós commented that everything possible had been done to rehabi-
litate those who had not committed any serious crimes. This was proof of the rejection of
cruelty by those who had fought for “National Spain”: “The Christian ‘Caudillo’ who
345rules us knows that only love and clemency can strengthen governments. Cruelty is
cowardice, and our liberating war was won by courage and heroism, virtues that can only
coexist with greatness of heart.”52
Conclusion
After the events that occurred following the military coup in Spain on 18 July 1936, political
350violence soon became a criminal action against those who did not support the National
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Uprising. In a situation of war, the application of criminal justice meant a break with the
previous legal order and positivist theory of law. Criminal justice was an instrument of terror
under the declaration of the State ofWar, which legalized ad hoc the extralegal repression that
insurgents exercised from the start of the military rebellion. This feature was due to the
355extension of the special military jurisdiction, the elimination of individual procedural guar-
antees, and the restoration of the death penalty, affecting both combatants and the civilian
population. The action of military justice during the civil war and the immediate post-war
period was not just one more chapter of the recurrent militarization of public order in
previous periods in Spain. It was the application of military extremism in the use of violence
360in a context of totalwar, as hadhappened in the colonial wars and the areas occupiedmilitarily
during the Great War. From 1936, the Spanish war jurisdiction acted as so-called political
justice, in the same way that the military jurisdiction of the Wehrmacht did in the countries
occupied from 1939.53
This feature was a particularity of the Spanish case in the context of the inter-war period
365regarding what happened in other contemporary dictatorial regimes. In Italy, there was
initially a continuity of the liberal rule of law, at least until 1927, in spite of the weakening
of the guarantor principles of legal positivism and the use of some previous mechanisms to
control the judicial apparatus.54 In Germany, where the legal order of the Weimar Republic
was radically transformed, the legal revolution of Nazismwas not carried out by replacing the
370previous legal body. Under the suspension of the fundamental rights of the Weimar
Constitution, the timely approval of a set of laws left the existing legislation intact in everything
else.55 In this case, the new idea of Law broke with the legal positivist doctrine through the
principle of authority, the special law and the single party, which meant turning a whole legal
system on its head through nothing more than interpretation.56
375Fascism did not implement a sui generis unitary legal theory when it came to power in
the liberal State. However, we should highlight a common element among the dictatorial
regimes of the period: the extensive use of exceptional criminal justice. This happened in
Italy through the creation of the Tribunale speciale per la difesa dello Stato by law 2008 of
1926, and in Germany, together with the enactment of racial laws, with the approval of
380the Volksgerichtshof (People’s Court) on 24 April 1934.57 In the Spanish New State, this
happened with the extension of special jurisdictions in 1939 and 1940 through the Law of
Political Responsibilities and the Law on the repression of Freemasonry and
Communism, within the framework of a new Criminal Law, which culminated in the
Penal Code of 1944. In general, it was a jurisprudence that entailed the legal admission of
385the category of the enemy in the definition of the crime through the application of actor-
based criminal law. Together with the introduction of preventive detention for the first
time in the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure of 1930, this transformed the dictatorial
power into a Dual State (der Doppelstaat). In 1941, the German jurist Ernst Fraenkel
highlighted the dual hybridization in dictatorships between the “normative state” (der
390Normenstaat), whose action is based on a positive legal regulation audited judicially, and
the exceptional “state of measures” (der Maßnahmenstaat), governed by discretion
according to the convenience or political opportunity of power.58
The rupture caused by this form of dictatorial power with the rule of law of the
Spanish Republic made it particularly necessary not only to justify the legality of the New
395State, but also to legitimize the very fact of the military coup by demonstrating the
illegitimacy of the Constitution of 1931 and the guilt of the Republican and left-wing
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governments. Thus, the doctrine and practice of law was not only a technical task, but an
essential element in the foundation and political action, which were framed and acquired
meaning within a broader collective vision.59 As in any mobilization, the civil war in
400Spain led to the exaltation of the spirit as an antithesis of the enemy, imbuing the
propaganda with a sense of belonging to a common identity. The unifying and mobiliz-
ing force of the images used by the rhetoric of the fervent nationalist discourse of the
rebels was war propaganda, but also something else when resorting to an imagined
community.60 As had happened in other European conflicts, the war in Spain was
405imbued with a sense of divine mission, pre-existing archetypes were reproduced and
their spirit was exalted as an antithesis of the enemy. The extreme cruelty of violent
actions in the war was interwoven with the dehumanization of the victims. This hap-
pened through the imaginary representation of the enemy in the form of cultural
stereotypes: preconceived ideas that determine the process of perception, classifying
410objects as familiar or strange, and that emphasize, in doing so, their differences through
a series of signs. The proper political distinction between friend and enemy constituted
a fundamental pole of tension of the culture of war of the Spanish New State as an
essential political community fighting against the anti-Spain—a collective representation
that was deeply influenced by Catholic political theology and Spanish reactionary
415thought as a distinctive element.
Notes
1. A first version of part of this article was published in Francisco Sevillano, “Política
y criminalidad en el ‘nuevo Estado’ franquista. La criminalización del ‘enemigo’ en el
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